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Abstract
We explore facets of conditional cooperation in a public goods game. First, we replicate the
Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) result that the majority of subjects in public goods
experiments are conditional cooperators. Next, given that the majority of subjects in our
study are conditional cooperators, we look at what happens when subjects are given
additional information about the presence of conditional cooperators in the group. We find
that such information about the presence of conditional cooperators leads to an increase in
contributions overall. However this increase in contributions is most pronounced for the
conditional cooperators.
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There is now a large body of work which uses a voluntary contributions mechanism 
to study the inherent tension between contributing to a public good and free riding on others’ 
contributions.
1 Prior experimental research looking at voluntary contributions to a public 
good reports two empirical regularities. First, in one-shot public goods games, the average 
contribution to the public account ranges between 40% and 60% of the total endowment with 
wide variations in individual contributions ranging between 0% and 100%. Second, in 
repeated public goods games, the average contributions in the initial rounds range between 
40% and 60% but then the contributions decline over time  even though the strong free-riding 
hypothesis of zero contribution is seldom borne out.  
      Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) find that a majority of subjects in these 
experiments are “conditional cooperators”. They define conditional cooperators as subjects 
whose contributions are positively correlated with the expected contribution of others and 
whose behaviour, therefore, is not consistent with the free riding hypothesis. Fischbacher et 
al. report that 50% of the participants in their study are conditional cooperators. This finding 
that a majority of subjects are conditional cooperators has been replicated by Burlando and 
Guala (2005), Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2005), Croson (2002), Houser and Kurzban 
(2005), Keser and van Winden (2000) and Kocher (2004).  
In this study we explore the issue of conditional cooperation. We aim to do the 
following. First, we replicate the Fischbacher et al. (2001) result that a majority of subjects in 
our study are indeed conditional cooperators. The next question we explore is whether 
eliciting this information about conditional cooperation affects subsequent behavior. Third, 
we look at what happens when subjects are given additional information about the presence 
of conditional cooperators in the group. As Chaudhuri et al. (2005) point out additional 
information about the presence of conditional cooperators may or may not enhance 
efficiency. There are two possible arguments. First, given common information about the 
presence of conditional cooperators, non-cooperators have more of an incentive to imitate the 
cooperators initially and free-ride later in the game. Hence common information about the 
presence of conditional cooperators may induce more free riding. On the other hand, in the 
presence of conditional cooperators and common information about their presence, it is 
possible that the game is effectively transformed into a coordination problem with multiple 
equilibria; full defection is an equilibrium, full cooperation another equilibrium and there are 
other equilibria in between.  
Like Fischbacher et al. (2001) we find that a majority (62%) of our subjects are 
conditional cooperators. We find that eliciting information about conditional cooperation 
leads to an increase in average contributions in two of our three experimental conditions, but 
the significance of any such increase does depend on the model specification. However, if we 
look at the behaviour of the conditional cooperators exclusively, then we find a robust 
                                                 
1 Ledyard (1995) describes a generic linear public goods game as follows.  Subjects are grouped into fours and 
given an endowment of $5 each. They can choose either to contribute all or some of their endowment to a 
public account with any remaining amount going into a private account. The money contributed to the public 
account is doubled by the experimenter and redistributed equally among the four group members. Money put in 
the private account remains unchanged. The Pareto optimal solution is for everyone to contribute her entire 
endowment to the public account. The total amount in the public account is $20, which gets doubled to $40 by 
the experimenter. The $40 gets divided equally among the four group members and hence each member gets 
$10 - a return of 100%. However individual rationality predicts that no one would contribute to the public 
account. Suppose an individual contributes $1 to the public account, but no one else does. The $1 gets doubled 
to $2 which is then redistributed equally among the four group members giving each member $0.50. The 
individual who contributes $1 loses $0.50 while the other players (who did not contribute) gain $0.50. Given 
this game, theory suggests that a self-interested individual will not contribute to the public account.   increase in their contributions with additional information about the presence of conditional 
cooperators.  
We proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the experimental design. Section 3 reports 
our results. Section 4 contains a discussion of our results and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  Experimental design  
 
We have 88 subjects who are undergraduate students in Commerce at the University 
of Auckland. All experiments were conducted in a computer laboratory using the Veconlab 
software developed by Charles Holt at the University of Virginia.
2, 3  
Subjects are anonymously put into groups of 4 and randomly re-matched at the end of 
each round. At the beginning of each round, each subject is endowed with 10 tokens. In each 
round a subject can choose to put her money into either a public account or a private account. 
Total amount contributed to the public account is doubled and redistributed equally among 
the four members of the group. Money put into the private account remains unchanged. At 
the end of each round, subjects get to see (1) the contribution made by each member of the 
group and (2) their total earnings. The next round proceeds in the same way. Subjects played 
the game for ten rounds. A subject’s total earnings equal the sum of the per-round earnings 
for ten rounds.  
This experiment consists of 4 treatments. The first treatment is a Control Treatment 
where 20 subjects play the public goods game described above for 10 rounds. We then have 
three more treatments which build on the control treatment by providing progressively more 
information to the subjects. 
The second treatment – which we will call the Conditional Cooperation (henceforth 
“CC”) Treatment - builds on the control treatment by asking subjects to complete a 
“conditional cooperation questionnaire” prior to playing the public goods game. See Table 1 
for a copy of this questionnaire. The questionnaire asked each participant to state how much 
she will contribute to the public account if the average contribution by the other group 
members is between 0 - 0.99 tokens, 1 - 1.99 tokens, 2 - 2.99 tokens and so on.  There are 24 
subjects in the CC treatment. In order to make sure that the responses on this questionnaire 
were credible, we pick one subject in the session and this subject has to play the public goods 
game according to her responses on the questionnaire. In fact once this subject is picked her 
decisions for the actual game are entered by an assistant. For each round of the game, after 
all the other subjects have entered their decisions, we look at the average contribution of the 
others and then enter the appropriate contribution for this subject using her questionnaire 
responses. For instance suppose the group average for a particular round is 2.5 tokens and 
this subject said she would contribute 1 token if the average was between 2 and 2.99 tokens 
then we enter a “1” for her contribution for that particular round. Prior to the beginning of the 
session we put a red X on the back of one of the instruction sheets. Whoever gets the 
instruction sheet with the red X is the person who has to play in accordance with her 
questionnaire responses. Subjects are not told about this method of picking the conditional 
cooperator till after they have filled out the questionnaire. We use these responses to classify 
subjects into different types as in Fishbacher et al. (2001). 
The third treatment builds on the second by adding common information regarding 
the responses provided by the subjects on the conditional cooperation questionnaire. Here 
                                                 
2 http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/admin.htm
3 We rely mostly on the on-line instructions. We do use some supplementary instructions to gather the 
conditional cooperation information. These are available from the corresponding author upon request.  
 
  2subjects fill out the conditional cooperation questionnaire prior to playing the public goods 
game exactly as in the CC treatment. After collecting subjects’ answers, we take the average 
of all the responses for each category 0 – 0.99, 1 - 1.99, 2 - 2.99 and so on. Then we write 
down this average information publicly on the board in front of the room and read aloud the 
same information to the subjects prior to beginning the actual public goods game. Table 2 
illustrates what we mean. The number 0.625 which appears next to the category 0 – 0.99 
implies the following. If we take the responses as to how much each subject will contribute if 
the average group contribution is between 0 and 0.99 and then take the average of all those 
responses then we get a value of 0.625. Similarly if we look at the responses as to how much 
each subject will contribute if the average group contribution is between 1 and 1.99 tokens 
then the average of all those responses is 1.208. As can be seen from Table 2, the average 
hypothetical contributions increase as the average contribution by the other group members 
increase, which suggests the existence of conditional cooperators in the group.  We will refer 
to this treatment as the Conditional Cooperation plus Information (henceforth CC+Info) 
treatment. There are 24 subjects in this treatment.  
The aim here is the following. We know from past studies that the majority of people 
in such public goods games behave as conditional cooperators and they are willing to 
contribute more if others are also willing to do so. Thus we fully expected the responses of a 
majority of subjects on the conditional cooperation questionnaire to exhibit an upward trend. 
The question is – how does one convey information about the presence of other conditional 
cooperators to the subjects as a whole? We felt that providing the average of the hypothetical 
responses would demonstrate the upward trend in those responses to the subjects and would 
convince conditional cooperators about the presence of others with similar preferences. 
Chaudhuri, Graziano and Maitra (2005) point out that there is a strong positive correlation 
between a subject’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others and her contributions in round 
1 of a public goods game. Given the strong path dependence of contributions which typically 
show a declining pattern over time, it is imperative that contributions start at a high level for 
a group to be able to sustain high contributions over time. If subjects possess more optimistic 
beliefs about others’ contributions then it is more likely that they will start with high 
contributions. We conjecture that providing them with the aggregate information about the 
presence of conditional cooperators via the average response of the group might help in 
fostering such optimistic beliefs and lead to greater cooperation.  
The fourth and final treatment has subjects fill out the conditional cooperation 
questionnaire as in CC and also provides them with the information regarding the average of 
hypothetical contributions as in CC+Info. In addition to the above, in this treatment the 
experimenter makes a further announcement which reads as follows: 
 
“You should invest all 10 tokens in each period. 
 
As you can see, a majority of people in your group have indicated that 
they will invest more if others in the group invest more. If each participant 
in your group invests 10 tokens in every period, then the average choice of 
others will be 10 tokens and each participant will earn 20 tokens in every 
period.”  
 
We expected the average responses in this session to exhibit an upward trend which they did. 
In fact Table 2 provides those responses. The announcement we use in this fourth treatment 
is similar in spirit and language to the “Assign 80/Trigger 0” treatment in Seely, Van Huyck 
and Battalio (2005). The idea here is to drive home the point about the presence of 
conditional cooperators in case the average information showing the upward trend of 
  3responses in CC+Info does not succeed in conveying the appropriate message. We call this 
treatment Conditional Cooperation plus Information plus Announcement (henceforth 
CC+Info+Ann) treatment.  There are 20 subjects in this treatment. In the rest of the paper we 
use the abbreviations for the different treatments. Table 3 provides a handy guide to these 
abbreviations.   
Over 4 different treatments we have a total of 88 subjects. Each of them makes 10 
decisions with random re-matching at the end of each round. This gives us 880 observations 
in all. Each session lasts about an hour. Subjects are not allowed to communicate with each 
other in any way during the session. Each experimental token is equivalent to NZ $0.75. 
Average total earnings were 12.8 tokens or NZ $9.60.
4
 
3.   Results 
 
Result 1:  The majority of the subjects are conditional cooperators.  
 
Figure 1 shows the information obtained from the conditional cooperation 
questionnaire. In creating this chart we use the data provided by the 68 subject responses in 
CC, CC+Info and CC+Info+Ann treatments and take the average of all responses for each 
subject type. (We do not have this information from the 20 subjects in the control treatment.) 
We define “free riders” as those who contribute less than 1 token into the public account 
regardless of what others contribute. “Conditional cooperators” are those who increase their 
contribution as the average contribution of other group members increases. “Weak 
cooperators” are those who increase their contribution weakly as the average contribution by 
other group members increases but their contributions are not very high in general and far 
less than the conditional cooperators’ contributions. The “hump-shaped contributors” are 
those who increase their contribution as the average contribution by others increases but as 
the contribution by others reaches 5 tokens or more, the contribution by hump-shaped 
contributors starts to decrease steadily.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, 42 out of 68 subjects (about 62%) are conditional 
cooperators. This result is consistent with that of Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001), who 
found that 50% of their 42 subjects are conditional cooperators. 5 subjects (7%) are weak 
cooperators, 11 (16%) are free riders and 6 (9%) are hump-shaped contributors. The 
remaining 4 subjects show various different patterns which do not fit easily into the above 
categories and we leave them out of Figure 1.  
 
Result 2: Providing additional information about the presence of conditional cooperators 
increases contributions.  
 
Figure 2 shows the behavior of contributions over time. For all four treatments, the 
contribution into the public account declines over time. The overall average contribution is 
19.2% in the control treatment, 27.7% in CC, 31.5% in CC+Info and 31.1% in 
CC+Info+Ann.  See Table 4.  
A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test for the equality of distributions finds a significant 
difference between the four treatments (χ
2 = 17.194 (3 d.f.), p = 0.00). In Table 5 we use the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon ranksum test with the null hypothesis that the contributions in any 
two treatments came from the same distribution.  Each cell provides the value of the test-
statistic and the corresponding p-value. The results suggest that the null hypothesis can be 
                                                 
4 At the time the experiments were carried out the approximate exchange rate was NZ $1 = US $0.72. 
  4rejected for the CC and control comparison as well as the CC+Info and control comparison. 
Other differences do not appear to be significant.   
Next we use regression analysis to understand the pattern of contributions in the 
various treatments. What we have here is a cross-section of subjects making a series of 
decisions over time. Thus the appropriate way to treat the data generated is to use a panel 
data model. Let   be the contribution of player i in round t. This observed contribution 
 equals the desired contribution,   (which is a latent variable), if and only if 
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2 0, N ν σ  and the errors 
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2 0, N ) ε σ  independent of  i ν . Each subject’s contribution is bounded by zero from 
below and by ten (the token endowment) from above and thus we estimate this model as a 
random effects Tobit. For the sake of comparison we also compute the corresponding random 
effects GLS regression but the latter does not account for the lower and upper censoring of 
the dependent variable. We look at two different specifications. In the first we include among 
the independent variables (1) round and (2) three dummies – one each for CC, CC+Info and 
CC+Info+Ann with the control treatment being the reference category. In the second 
specification we add (3) lag own contribution i.e. contributions made by subject i at time t-1 
and (4) lag average contribution of other group members, i.e., the average contribution made 
by the other three members of the group (that includes subject i) at time t-1. The results of 
the random effects Tobit regression and the random effects GLS regression are presented in 
Table 6.
5
The results for both the Tobit and the random effects regression are similar. The 
coefficient on the round variable is negative and statistically significant. Compared to the 
control treatment (which is the reference category), contributions are significantly higher in 
the CC+Info treatment in the specifications which do not include the lagged contributions 
variables. But the coefficients for the CC treatment and the CC+Info+Ann treatment 
dummies are not significantly different from that for the control treatment. The coefficients 
for the lagged contributions variables are positive and strongly significant. If a subject 
contributed more in the previous round then she will contribute more in the current round and 
also if a subject’s group members contributed more in the previous round then she will 
contribute more in the current round. Once we include these lagged contributions variables 
the coefficient for the CC+Info treatment dummy is not significant any more. In retrospect 
we found the fact that contributions are not higher in CC+Info+Ann surprising and we 
address this in more detail below where we focus exclusively on the behaviour of conditional 
cooperators. 
 
                                                 
5 When we include the lagged variables as regressors we lose 1 observation for each subject. So we lose 88 
observations in total leaving us with 792 observations.  
  5Result 3: If we focus on the behaviour of conditional cooperators only, then we find that they 
contribute the most in the CC+Info+Ann treatment.   
 
Given that a majority of our subjects are conditional cooperators, we now focus 
exclusively on their behaviour in the three treatments: CC, CC+Info and CC+Info+Ann. 
There are 16 conditional cooperators out of 24 subjects in the CC treatment, 17 out of 24 in 
the CC+Info treatment and 9 out of 20 in the CC+Info+Ann treatment. Figure 3 shows the 
average contribution by conditional cooperators over time. Their average contribution in 
round 1 is 53.3% in the CC treatment, 39.1% in the CC+Info treatment and 84.4% in the 
CC+Info+Ann treatment and their overall average contribution is 33.1% in the CC 
Treatment, 39.3% in the CC+Info Treatment and 52.9% in the CC+Info+Ann treatment.  
If we carry out pair-wise Wilcoxon ranksum tests then we find that contributions are 
significantly higher in the CC+Info+Ann treatment compared to the CC Treatment (z = 3.70, 
p = 0.00) and also the CC+Info treatment (z = 3.00, p = 0.00). Differences in contributions 
by conditional cooperators in the CC treatment and CC+Info treatment are not statistically 
significant.  
  Once again we use regression analysis to understand the pattern of contributions by 
conditional cooperators in various treatments. As we did above, we look at both a random 
effects Tobit regression and a random effects regression. We look at two different 
specifications. In the first we include among the independent variables (1) round and (2) two 
dummies – one each for CC+Info and CC+Info+Ann with the CC treatment being the 
reference category. In the second specification we add (3) lag own contribution i.e. 
contributions made by subject i at time t-1 and (4) lag average contribution of other group 
members, i.e., the contributions made by the other three members of the group (that includes 
subject i) at time t-1.  
The results of random effects Tobit regression and the random effects GLS regression 
are presented in Table 7. The coefficient for the CC+Info+Ann treatment dummy is positive 
and significant in all specifications.  But the dummy for CC+Info treatment is not significant. 
This implies that compared to the CC treatment, which is the reference category, 
contributions by conditional cooperators are higher in the CC+info+Ann treatment but not in 
the CC+Info treatment. As in Table 6, both the lagged variables are positive and significant.  
  
4.   Discussion of our results 
 
Our results then suggest that providing additional information to subjects about the 
presence of conditional cooperators does enhance cooperation – especially among 
conditional cooperators - possibly by creating more optimistic beliefs. However we also find 
that overall contributions are not higher in the CC+Info+Ann treatment compared to the 
control treatment, even though ex ante we expected this to be the case. We conjecture that a 
couple of factors contributed to this. First, when we look at Figure 2 we find that 
contributions start at a relatively high level in round 1 (62%) in the CC+Info+Ann treatment 
but they decay rapidly so that by round 4 contributions in this treatment have dropped to 
around 20%.  If we now look at Figure 3 then we find that part of this sharp drop can be 
attributed to the reduction in contribution by the conditional cooperators. The conditional 
cooperators start out at contributions of 84% in round 1 but by round 4 their contributions fall 
to about 40%. We believe that the CC+Info+Ann treatment does generate optimistic beliefs 
among the conditional cooperators about the contributions of others but once the conditional 
cooperators find that others are not contributing as much there is a greater sense of 
disillusionment in this treatment which results in the sharp drop in contributions especially 
between rounds 3 and 4. If we look at the other types of subjects we find that in the 
  6CC+Info+Ann treatment there are 7 subjects who are classified as free-riders (n = 5) or weak 
cooperators (n = 2). These subjects contribute less in the CC+Info+Ann treatment compared 
to the CC or CC+Info treatments. The free-riders contribute only 12% on average in the 
CC+Info+Ann treatment compared to 22.5% in the CC+Info treatment and 18% in the CC 
treatment while the weak cooperators contribute only 5% on average as compared to 9% in 
CC+Info and 16% in CC. It is possible that these subjects reason as follows. They believe 
that the public announcement will generate more optimistic beliefs among the conditional 
cooperators who will contribute more in the CC+Info+Ann treatment. Therefore the free 
riders and weak cooperators mimic the cooperators in the beginning and then bail out and 
start free-riding much earlier in this treatment, compared to the other treatments, which in 
turn nullify the higher contribution of the conditional cooperators. Thus whether additional 
information about the presence of conditional cooperators will increase cooperation or not 
depends on the proportion of conditional cooperators among the subject pool and also the 
exact nature of the information being provided.  
We do need to qualify the results presented above with a caveat.
6 A number of prior 
studies, such as Andreoni (1995), Carpenter (2004), Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002), Houser 
and Kurzban (2002) and Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) find that a significant amount of the 
contributions to the public good can be attributed to confusion or a desire for conformity. In 
our study we are not able to distinguish between a particular treatment’s influence on 
conditional cooperation per se as opposed to that treatment’s effect on subject confusion or a 
subject’s willingness to engage in herding. Thus when a subject states that she will contribute 
more if others contribute more this may reflect conditional cooperation but it might also 
reflect a general tendency to herd.  
 
5.   Conclusion 
 
In this study we have shown the following. First, we show that the majority (62%) of 
subjects in our study are conditional cooperators, which is consistent with the results found in 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). Second, we find that in some cases additional information about 
the presence of conditional cooperators shown to subjects helps to generate higher 
contributions compared to the control treatment. Finally, we find that if we look at 
conditional cooperators exclusively, these subjects are the most cooperative in the 
CC+Info+Ann treatment compared to the others.  
                                                 
6 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this issue. 
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  8Table 1: Conditional Cooperation Questionnaire 
Please answer the following question: 
 
If the average of tokens contributed by 
the other people in my group is 
between 
Then I will contribute 
0 - 0.99   
1 - 1.99   
2 - 2.99   
3 - 3.99   
4 - 4.99   
5 - 5.99   
6 - 6.99   
7 - 7.99   
8 - 8.99   





Table 2: Example of Average Hypothetical Contributions in CC+Info and 
CC+Info+Ann Treatments 
If the average of tokens contributed by 
the other people in my group is 
between 
Average of Subject Responses  
0 - 0.99  0.625 
1 - 1.99  1.208 
2 - 2.99  1.625 
3 - 3.99  2.292 
4 - 4.99  3.125 
5 - 5.99  4.875 
6 - 6.99  5.458 
7 - 7.99  6.208 
8 - 8.99  6.682 
9 - 9.99  6.458 
10 6.917 
 
  9Table 3: An Overview of the Different Treatments and Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation  Referring to   Number of 
subjects 
Control  Control Treatment with subjects playing 
the public goods game. 
20 
CC  Conditional Cooperation Treatment:  
Subjects fill out the conditional cooperation 
questionnaire prior to playing the public 
goods game. 
24 
CC+Info  Conditional Cooperation plus 
Information Treatment: 
Subjects (1) fill out the conditional 
cooperation questionnaire and (2) also 
receive common information about average 
responses prior to playing the public goods 
game. 
24 
CC+Info+Ann  Conditional Cooperation plus 
Information plus Announcement 
Treatment: 
Subjects (1) fill out the conditional 
cooperation questionnaire and (2) also 
receive common information about average 
responses and (3) also hear an 
announcement about those average 
responses prior to playing the public goods 
game. 
20 
Total   88 
 
 
Table 4: Average Contribution (Percentages) 




19.2 27.7 31.5 31.1 
Round 1 
 
28.5 46 37.7 62 
Round 10 
 
4.5 9.4  12.1  13.6 
Rounds 1 – 5 
 
25.4 37.3 39.6 37.7 
Rounds 6 – 10 
 
12.9 18.1 23.4 24.4 
 
 
  10Table 5: Wilcoxon Ranksum Test of Significance 
  Control   CC  CC+Info   CC+Info+Ann 
 















Table 6: Regression Results for Contributions in the Different Treatments with the 
Control Treatment as the Reference Category 
 
  RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Regression  RE Regression 
























































Wald   
2 χ
 
132.10*** 160.17***  130.89***  468.67 
Number of 
Observations 
880  792 880 792 
Number 
Uncensored 
435 386  --  -- 
Number Lower 
Censored 
370 349  --  -- 
Number Upper 
Censored 
75 57  --  -- 
 
Note: ***,**,* denote 1, 5 and 10 percent significance respectively. 
Standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
  11Table 7: Regression Results for Contributions by the Conditional Cooperators only in 




RE Tobit  RE Tobit  RE Regression  RE Regression 
















































Wald   
2 χ
 
74.01*** 157.94***  83.20***  322.98 
Number of 
Observations 
420  378 420 378 
Number 
Uncensored 
257 231  --  -- 
Number Lower 
Censored 
107 103  --  -- 
Number Upper 
Censored 
56 44  --  -- 
 
Note: ***,**,* denote 1, 5 and 10 percent significance respectively. 

























































































  13Figure 3: Average Contributions by Conditional Cooperators Only 
Over Time in Different Treatments  
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